and those which allow animal apperception (e.g., New Essays 2.21.5). The tension is neither resolved nor dissolved here. Leibniz himself, argues Kulstad, struggled unsuccessfully to find a solution. On the one hand, Leibniz admits that 'it will ever be difficult to persuade men that beasts feel nothing' (l'heodicy, §10). (Why Leibniz should be similarly hard to persuade is not absolutely clear to me, although the 'nature makes no leaps' doctrine is obviously involved.) Denying animal apperception, . on the other hand, is presented as a theologically attractive option which would permit the drawing of a sharp distinction between beasts and humans, which in turn would allow Leiboiz to press the City of God doctrine and to justify divine reward and punishment of moral beings. Along the way, the key terms are explored and different senses introduced. It is important to distinguish apperception of what is outside of us (basically, the sensation of external things) from apperception of what is in us. This distinction is paralleled by two types of reflection: simple reflection or consciousness and focused reflection. Both involve the perceiving of an act of perception. In the perceptual act, we may distinguish three elements: the actor (the soul), the action (the operation) and that which is acted upon (the thing perceived). In simple reflection, attention is directed primarily to the thing perceived, to an image of sense, perhaps. In focused reflection, attention is directed primarily towards the soul and its operations, to what is properly 'in us'. (Questions are raised in this context concerning how much the soul can attend to at anyone time}. But apperception of what is in us and focused reflectioo are DOt identical. Apperception of what is in us is the widei' tenn, sometimes involving considtntions of abstraction and order (p. 144). We can order ttuths (more correctly, propositions) according to whether they are primitive (K' derived by deduction or demonstration and with varying degrees of complexity. All these truths count as being 'in us' and so are susceptible to being apperceived. Only human and higher beings are granted such mtional capabilities. Beasts, not being able to direct their attention to their own mental operations, are restricted to lower apperception and empirical, not deductive, reasoning.
This approach towards a solution of the tension finds its best expression in the New Essays. But by the time of the Principles, Leibniz has almost reverted to the denial of animal apperception, although examination of the context of t4 and its drafts reveals that the reversal was not perhaps complete and definitive. Leibniz is still vacillating. And why? Possibly because the distinction between humans and animals, if the New Essays solution was adopted, would come to rest on the distinction between those beings which can direct their attention to the operations of their own minds (focused reflection) and those which can practise reflection, even to the extent of perceiving the workings of their own souls, but which cannot focus their attention on those actions. A fme and delicate distinction. Too fine to carry the weight of the City of God. especially since there seems to be no reason why animals, if they can direct their attention to some things, would not also be able to direct their attention to the operations of their souls. Maybe the tension could never be resolved for the great chain of being will dictate that the boolerline is always fuzzy.
Kulstad is exceptionally fair throughout, subjecting each alternative reading, including those he most prefers, to penetrating criticism. His writing displays the clarity of his thought, with carefully chosen words and a system of textual signposts guiding the reader through the argument On account of both its contribution to the study of Leibniz and the method of historical philosophy employed, this book is a delight to scholars and advanced students alike. This erudite book is aimed more directly at specialists in theories of right and law, than at Leibniz scholars. Acknowledging a debt of inspiration to the remarkable historical work of Andr6 de Muralt. 1 the author inttoduces in variable detail the legal philosophy of Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf. Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Kant. with substantial fomys into Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham. Leibniz fits into this study less as its raison d' etre than as a piece in the puzzle, one local system of thought amid the galaxy of the modem school of natural right.
ulbnlz. et l'lco'k modern. du droit
The great project of the modem school is to determine the degree to which moral principles may be established apart particular they are concerned with two
